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Abstract 
 
This study assesses the mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge for better governance in 
Sub-Saharan Africa  from 2000 to 2012. For this purpose we employ Generalised Method of 
Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. The empirical evidence is based on three 
complementary knowledge diffusion variables (innovation, internet penetration and 
educational quality) and ten governance indicators that are bundled and unbundled. The 
following are the main findings. First, there is an unconditional positive effect of mobile 
phone penetration on good governance. Second, the net effects on political, economic and 
institutional governances that are associated with the interaction of the mobile phone with 
knowledge diffusion variables are positive for the most part. Third, countries with low levels 
of governance are catching-up their counterparts with higher levels of governance. The above 
findings are broadly consistent with theoretical underpinnings on the relevance of mobile 
phones in mitigating bad governance in Africa. The evidence of some insignificant net effects 
and decreasing marginal impacts may be an indication that the mobile phone could also be 
employed to decrease government quality. Overall, this study has established net positive 
effects for the most part.  Five rationales could elicit the positive net effects on good 
governance from the interaction between mobile phones and knowledge diffusion, among 
others, the knowledge variables enhance: reach, access, adoption, cost-effectiveness and 
interaction. In a nut shell, the positive net effects are apparent because the knowledge 
diffusion variables complement mobile phones in reducing information asymmetry and 
monopoly that create conducive conditions for bad governance. The contribution of the 
findings to existing theories and justifications of the underlying positive net effects are 
discussed.  
JEL Classification: G20; O38; O40; O55; P37 
Keywords: Mobile phones; Governance; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
 Positioning an inquiry on the relevance of knowledge diffusion in mobile phone 
penetration1 for institutional quality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is motivated by at least six 
important strands in recent literature.  
First, the phenomenon of globalisation is now an ineluctable process whose challenges 
can be neglected only by sacrificing the prosperity of nation states. Accordingly, there is a 
growing consensus in the literature that in the current era of globalisation, for nations to be 
competitive and well-integrated into the global economy, they need competitive edges in a 
number of fields (Tchamyou, 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Asongu, 2015a). According to the 
narrative, competition in the 21st century is fundamentally centred on the ability of a nation to 
acquire and diffuse new knowledge. The concept of the knowledge economy (KE) has been 
mastered by Europe and North America which are inexorably setting the course of 
development in the international arena. Moreover, the historic pattern formulated by Japan 
has influenced the KE courses of Malaysia, China and the Newly Industrialized Economies of 
Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan). Whereas other Asian and Latin 
American nations have been responding in calculated strategies that articulate the quest for 
KE in their growing pursuits of national and regional initiatives, the overall knowledge index 
of Africa has been dropping (see, Anyanwu, 2012; Asongu, 2015b). It follows that there is a 
policy syndrome of KE in African countries when compared with their developed and 
developing counterparts.  
Second, in terms of mobile phones, frontier markets of Europe, Asia and North 
America have been witnessing some stabilization in growth (Asongu, 2015a). This trend is in 
accordance with Penard et al. (2012) who concluded that, as of 2010, penetrations rates of the 
                                                          
1 For the purpose of simplicity, the terms ‘mobile phone’, ‘mobile’, ‘mobile telephony’ and ‘mobile phone 
penetration’ are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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internet and mobile phones in Africa were not symmetrical. According to the authors, while 
mobile and internet penetration rates have attained saturation points in developed countries, 
African nations are currently experiencing some asymmetric development in the engaged 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), notably with 41% (9.6%) for mobile 
(internet) penetration. In the light of this fact, it is apparent that the mobile phone still has 
important potentials in Africa, which could represent significant development opportunities if 
well-tailored towards critical development outcomes. 
Third, there are growing requests in scholarly and policy-making circles for the mobile 
phone not to be considered as a silver bullet of development (see Mpogole et al., 2008, p. 71; 
Asongu & De Moor, 2015). Within this skeptical framework, authors have recommended 
more scholarly research on the development outcomes of mobile phones.  
Fourth, a World Bank report of April 2015 on Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) shows that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world, with the 
exception of SSA, where about 45% of countries in the sub-region are still far from reaching 
the MDGs extreme poverty target (see World Bank, 2015). This dismal evidence substantially 
contrasts with the sub-region enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence that 
began in the mid 1990s (see Fosu, 2015a, p. 44). The immiserizing growth in the sub-region 
has also motivated a recent stream of institutional literature; notably, some recent books by (i) 
Fosu (2015bc) on the nexus between growth and institutions in African development which 
aims to elicit whether the recent growth resurgence experienced by the sub-region is a myth or 
a reality and (ii) Kuada (2015) on the need to lay more emphasis on soft economics or human 
capability development in order to understand development trends in the sub-region.  
Fifth, government quality has been documented in recent literature to be strongly 
associated with inclusive growth, notably, in improving standards of living through more 
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efficient allocation of economic resources (Fosu, 2013ab;  Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; 
Fonchingong, 2014) and in consolidating the basis of social change (Efobi, 2015).  
Sixth, the growing literature on development outcomes from mobile phone penetration 
has scarcely engaged the effect on government quality in the sub-region, in spite of the 
documented role of mobile phones (Asongu, 2015c) and quality of institutions (Fosu, 2015bc) 
in inclusive development. In essence, to the best of our knowledge there are currently only 
four studies that have been positioned on the role of mobile phones in institutional quality in 
Africa (Snow, 2009; Mathias, 2012; Gagliardone, 2015; Porter et al., 2016). Snow (2009) 
established a negative  link between a nation’s mobile phone penetration rate and her 
perceived corruption level. The growing role of connectivity in consolidating accountability 
in Africa  was documented by Mathias (2012). The connection between government quality 
and mobile-radio interactions was assessed by Gargliardone (2015) who concluded that the 
underlying interactions can significantly enhance government’s efforts towards more 
corrective and preventive measures in Kenya. The inquiry by Porter al (2015) on South 
Africa, Malawi and Ghana established that the burgeoning mobile usage by the youth on the 
continent has potentials to be tailored towards greater harmony between practice and policy.  
Noticeably, the discussed literature leaves room for improvement in at least five areas. 
First, contrary to engaged country-specific studies that are characterised with policy 
implications of limited scope, it is important to position inquiries on broader sets of countries 
for results with policy outcomes of greater application scope (see Porter al., 2016; Snow, 
2009). Second, the engaged literature has focused on limited dimensions of government 
quality. This is the case with Snow (2009) who focuses on corruption which is only one  
aspect of institutional governance. Third, some inquiries have either not directly linked 
institutional quality to policy outcomes (see Porter et al., 2016) or not directly focused on the 
employment of mobile phones for greater government quality (see Gagliardone, 2015). 
6 
 
Fourth, some findings have cautious policy implications because the underlying empirical 
analyses are statistically fragile. For example, whereas Snow (2009) argued that there is  a 
negative relationship between mobile phones and corruption, his  findings should be 
welcomed with caution because they are not based on causality but on correlations. Fifth, on 
the complementarity between KE and mobile phones, Gargliardone (2015) has used mobile-
radio interactions. We employ three KE variables.  
The present study addresses the above first-four gaps by assessing the role of the 
mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge for government quality in SSA. The empirical 
evidence is based on a panel of 49 African countries and an endogeneity-robust Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations. The knowledge diffusion 
variables on which the mobile phone is interacted in order to address the fifth gap are: 
education, innovation and internet penetration. Ten governance indicators are used consisting 
of six unbundled variables (voice & accountability, political stability/no violence, corruption-
control, rule of law, government effectiveness and regulation quality) and four bundled 
indicators (political, economic, institutional and general governance dynamics). The purpose 
of bundling and unbundling governance indicators is to avail room for robustness and more 
policy implications.   
The rest of the study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we clarify the concepts of 
governance and mobile (m)-governance on the one hand and present the intuition and 
theoretical underpinnings on the other hand. The data and methodology are covered in Section 
3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results while Section 5 concludes with policy 
implications and future research directions.   
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2. Clarification of Governance Concepts and Theoretical Highlights  
2.1 Intuition and Theory 
 Consistent with Hellstorm (2008), ICTs are important instruments for improving 
governance because they enhance accountability, openness, transparency and the free-flow of 
information between various departments and institutions within a government. The narrative 
shows that mobile phones also facilitate information diffusion between the government and 
citizens on the one hand and the direct participation of citizens in the making of decisions that 
affect their livelihoods on the other.  In summary, the above are also achieved by the overall 
appeal of the mobile phone in converging societies for better connection, participation, 
innovation and information.  
 With the above intuition in mind, Snow (2009, pp. 337-339) has documented 
theoretical underpinnings linking the mobile phone to better government quality. According 
to the theory, the historic dearth of ICTs in Africa endowed the elite with preferential ICTs 
facilities. This edge in ICTs substantially constrained transparency and accountability in the 
management of government offices. Hence, the elite were confronted with good conditions 
for corruption and mismanagement of public goods. Conversely, with the rapid and massive 
diffusion of ICTs in general and mobile telephony in particular, opportunities for rent- 
seeking and capitalising on information asymmetry for corrupt purposes are being 
increasingly reduced. In essence, the author postulates that decentralisation of ICT has broken 
secrecy barriers that until now have prevented, inter alia: the detection of corruption in 
public/private circles as well as oversight and punishment of corrupt officials. In  a nutshell, 
the logic underpinning this theory essentially builds on the intuition discussed by Hellstorm 
(2008), notably: the mobile has substantially reduced the longstanding monopoly of 
information by the elite which resulted in corrupt behaviour and mismanagement.  
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2.2 Clarification of Governance and Mobile (m)-governance Concepts 
 This section is engaged in four principal strands, namely: (i) the concept of (m)-
governance,  (ii) definitions of governance accepted in recent literature, (iii) debates on the 
quality of mainstream governance indicators and (iv) the policy relevance of bundling and 
unbundling institutions.  
 The first aspect clarifies the concept of m-governance. In accordance with Hellstorm 
(2008), m-governance should be understood as the use of ICT to improve benefits by parties 
engaged in electronic (e)-governance. These parties include, inter alia: government units, 
citizens and business units. Hellstorm argues that the usage of mobile telephony to enhance 
government quality consists of using the mobile phone to improve, among others: citizenary 
participation, public service delivery and respect for  institutions within a nation.  
  In the second strand, there are a plethora of definitions to the governance concept. For 
the interest of brevity, we are consistent with Asongu (2016) in discussing four main 
definitions in the light of recent literature. (1) Dixit (2009) defines economic governance as 
the  ‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic 
activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and 
taking collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure’ (p.5). (2) 
According to Fukuyama (2013), the concept of governance can be consolidated by the 
comprehension of four principal approaches to ‘state quality’, namely: capacity indicators 
which encompass professionalism and resource levels, political measures and output 
indicators. (3) In accordance with Tusalem (2015), governance is a phenomenon that 
embodies: the rule of law, regulation quality, bureaucratic effectiveness and the reduction of 
corruption. (4) To the best of our knowledge, the most popular governance indicators are 
those from Kaufmann et al. (2010). The corresponding six indicators are classified into three 
categories, namely: (i) ‘institutional governance’ which is the respect of the State and citizens 
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of institutions that govern interactions between them (measured with corruption-control and 
the rule of law); (ii) ‘political governance’ which is the election and replacement of political 
leaders (proxied with political stability/no violence and voice and accountability) and (iii)  
‘economic governance’, which is defined as the formulation and implementation of policies 
that deliver public commodities (measured with  government effectiveness and regulation 
quality).  
 The third component is concerned with criticisms associated with application of the 
underlying Kaufmann et al. (2010) indicators. Accordingly, despite some criticisms in 
scholarly circles, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have been promptly responding to critics. 
One of the most interesting debates (to the best of our knowledge) has been with Andrew 
Schrank and Marcus Kurtz. For brevity and lack of space, we invite the interested reader to 
consult the main currents underlying the debate, namely: measures and mechanisms (Kurtz & 
Schrank, 2007a); a reply (Kaufmann et al., 2007a); a defense (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007b) and a 
rejoinder (Kaufmann et al., 2007b).  
 In the last strand, we devote space to articulating the intuition for bundling and 
unbundling governance indicators in order to present findings with more robustness and 
greater room for policy implications. For this purpose, the six governance indicators from 
Kaufmann et al. are bundled into political, economic, institutional and general governances. 
The relevance of unbundling and bundling governance variables is in accordance with an 
evolving stream of literature on institutional quality in Africa, notably: (i) predicting the Arab 
Spring based on negative governance signals (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a); (ii) economic 
governance as the most important determinant of innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015) and (iii) 
governance tools in the fight against software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) and 
conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016) in Africa.  Beyond the framework of 
African institutonal literature, the six governnce indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have 
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been considered in other branches of governance literature (see Gani, 2011; Andrés et al., 
2015; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015).  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
 This study examines a panel of forty-nine nations in SSA with data from World Bank 
Development Indicators and World Bank Governance Indicators for the period 2000-2012. 
The variables consist of both ordinal and interval data. In accordance with Tchamyou (2015) 
from recent KE literature, the mobile phone penetration or independent indicator of interest is 
proxied with the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people). Consistent with the narrative 
in Section 2, the six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are adopted as 
dependent variables. These are subsequently bundled into four governance composite 
indicators by means of principal component analysis (PCA) in Section 3.2.1. Accordingly, the 
underlying six governance dynamics are: the rule of law, corruption-control, regulation 
quality, government effectiveness, political stability/no violence and voice and accountability. 
The literature justifying the choice of underlying governance variables has been discussed in 
Section 2. The governance variables are perception-based measurements. Such perceptions 
can be influenced by media propaganda as well as information and communication 
technology like mobile phones. 
 Three of the four pillars of the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) are 
used as knowledge diffusion variables, notably: education, innovation and ICT. First, 
education is measured with the ‘pupil-teacher ratio’ in primary education. The choice of this 
indicator is motivated by constraints in data availability and the comparative importance of 
primary education.  It is important to note that we have been confronted with substantial 
issues in degrees of freedom with regards to other educational quality indicators like the 
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‘pupil-teacher ratio in secondary education’. Moreover, relative to other levels of education, 
more positive development externalities have been documented to derive from primary 
education when countries are at initial stages of industrialisation.  In essence, Petrakis and 
Stamatakis (2002) and Asiedu (2014) have argued that, compared to other levels of education, 
the underlying form of education is linked to higher social returns in undeveloped/developing 
countries. Second, consistent with Tchamyou (2015), issues in degrees of freedom for 
innovation indicators, like patent and trademark applications, motivate the study to use the 
number of Scientific and Technical Journal Articles (STJA) published annually as a proxy for 
innovation. Third, in accordance with the motivation provided in the introduction from Penard 
et al. (2012), the study uses internet penetration as a complementary ICT indicator because of 
its high development potential in the sub-region.  
 Adopted variables of control are: foreign aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), 
population growth and economic growth. First, while financial globalisation has been 
documented by Lalountas et al. (2011) to reduce corruption in developing countries, the effect 
is open to debate when other governance indicators come into play.  Second, the impact of 
foreign aid on governance is also debatable. While Okada and Samreth (2012) have 
established a negative relationship with corruption in developing countries, Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016b) concluded on negative causalities between foreign aid and the six good 
governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010). Third, population growth and economic 
growth have recently been employed by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) in predicting the 
Arab Spring based on negative governance signals. A positive nexus between these indicators 
may be expected because income levels are linked to higher governance standards and with a 
growing population, more government resources are expected to be devoted to serving and 
managing the population. On a cautious note, it is also important to balance this intuition with 
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the fact that positive demographic change could also impede the government’s ability to 
manage a growing population effectively.  
 Appendix 1 presents the definition of variables and their corresponding sources. The 
summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2 whereas Appendix 3 presents the correlation 
matrix. Based on the information provided by the summary statistics, it is apparent that: (i) 
means of the variables are comparable and (ii) from the corresponding standard deviations, 
we can be confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. The objective of 
the correlation matrix is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity that could 
significantly bias estimated coefficients. From a preliminary assessment, the high degree of 
substitution among governance indicators is apparent. In accordance with the discourse in 
Section 2 on the imperative to unbundle and bundle governance dynamics, conceptual priority 
takes precedence over degrees of substitution. Moreover, the issue of multicollinearity is not 
of a nature to bias estimated coefficients because the governance indicators are used 
exclusively as dependent variables in distinct specifications.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 The study employs PCA to bundle the six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) into four composite indicators, namely; institutional, political, economic and general 
governances. This technique is in accordance with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) from 
recent African institutional literature. Whereas like factor analysis, PCA is designed for 
interval data, it can also be used for ordinal data (like Likert scales), when the variables are 
linearly related to each other. This is the case of the governance variables because they are 
highly correlated. The PCA is a statistical method that is employed to reduce a large set of 
highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated indicators called principal 
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components (PCs). These PCs represent a considerable variation or information in the original 
dataset. In this light, the six governance indicators are reduced to one common factor or 
general governance. The derived governance variable is a composite indicator with three-sub 
composite indicators, namely: political governance (consisting of political stability and voice 
& accountability); economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and institutional governance (encompassing the rule of law and corruption-control). 
Political governance is defined as the election and replacement of political leaders. Economic 
governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public 
commodities. Institutional governance is the respect of the State and citizens for institutions 
that govern interactions between them.  
 The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion is used to retain common factors. 
According to the authors, only common factors with an eigenvalue greater than one or the 
mean should be retained. It is apparent from Table 1 that General Governance (G.Gov), which 
accounts for more than 81 percent of the information in the six governance indicators, has an 
eigenvalue of 4.892. In the same perspective, institutional governance (Instgov), economic 
governance (Ecogov) and political governance (Polgov) have total variations (eigenvalues) of 
93.0 percent, 93.9 percent and 83.5 percent (eigenvalues of 1.861, 1.878 and 1.671) 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Composite Governance  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 We briefly devote space to discussing a number of concerns that may be associated 
with variables obtained from other regressions. According to Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2016a), the documented concerns are linked to the efficiency and consistency of estimated 
coefficients as well as the validity of corresponding inferences. Pagan (1984, p.242) had 
established that while two-step estimators are efficient and consistent, few valid inferences 
can be drawn. This caution is consistent with an interesting stream of literature on the subject, 
namely by: Oxley and McAleer (1993), McKenzie and McAleer (1997), Ba and Ng (2006) 
and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a).  
 Putting the above concern into perspective, Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) are 
to the best of our knowledge authors who have addressed the inferential quality of PC-
augmented variables in the literature. The authors build on a bulk of previous studies ( 
(Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 
2012) to establish that it is possible to engage normal inferences from PC augmented 
regressions if estimated coefficients converge to their true values at the rate NT  , (with T 
being the number of time series and N denoting cross-section observations).  They have 
further articulated that for the underlying convergence to occur, T and N have to be 
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sufficiently large. Unfortunately, as far as we know, the authors do not specify how ‘large is 
large’.  
Within the specific context of this study, we are faced with two major concerns. First, 
N cannot be further increased because all existing 49 nations in SSA have been included. 
Second, extending T will be at the risk of compromising the validity of specifications since it 
will result in instrument proliferation that will bias estimated results. In a nutshell, in our 
opinion, valid inferences are possible because Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) have recently 
concluded using the same governance indicators (though with lower T and N) that inferences 
do not substantially differ whether bundled or unbundled governance variables are used.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 The estimation approach adopted in  this study is the GMM technique. As documented 
in Asongu and De Moor (2016), five main reasons motivate the choice of this technique. 
Whereas the first-two consists of requirements for adopting the estimation strategy, the last-
three constitute advantages associated with the estimation technique. First, the estimation 
procedure is a good fit because the dependent variables are persistent. As apparent in 
Appendix 4, the rule of thumb threshold (0.800) for persistence in the dependent variables is 
met because the lowest correlation coefficient between governance dynamics and their 
corresponding lagged values is 0.965.  Second, the number of years per country (T) is lower 
than the number of countries (N). Therefore, the T(12)<N(49) condition for GMM application 
is also satisfied. Third, the estimation technique controls for potential endogeneity in all 
regressors. Fourth, cross-country variations are not eliminated with the approach. Fifth, it is 
on the basis of the fourth advantage that Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) have recommended that 
the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) is a better fit 
compared to the difference estimator from Arellano and Bond (1991).  
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 In this study, we adopt the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) 
which uses forward orthogonal deviations in place of first differences. The estimation 
approach has been documented to: (i) control for cross-country dependence and (ii) limit the 
proliferation of instruments or restrict over-identification (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008). A two-step approach is adopted in the specification because it controls for 
heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the one-step approach is consistent with homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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Where: tiG ,  
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance) of 
country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
 represents tau;  M , Mobile phone penetration; K , 
denotes knowledge diffusion variables (educational quality, innovation and internet 
penetration); W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, population growth, foreign 
investment, and foreign aid),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  
and ti ,  the error term. It is important to note that the difference equation is derived from the 
level equation and   tau, which defines the autoregressive order, is one. In other words, it is 
one because data averages or non-overlapping intervals are not used.  
 Given that the estimation technique being employed consists of using interactive 
regressions, it is relevant to briefly discuss some pitfalls associated with interactive 
regressions that have been recognized by Brambor et al. (2006). According to these authors, 
all constitutive variables should be involved in the specifications.  Moreover, for the estimated 
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parameters to make economic sense, they should be interpreted as conditional marginal 
impacts.  
 
3.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 Consistent with recent literature (Love &  Zicchino, 2006; Dewan & Ramaprasad, 
2014, Asongu & De Moor, 2016), we treat all independent variables as predetermined or 
suspected endogenous variables. Therefore, the gmmstyle is used for them. Only ‘years’ are 
considered as strictly exogenous and the procedure for treating the ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, 
eq(diff))’ because it is not very likely for years to become endogenous in first-difference (see 
Asongu & De Moor, 2016).  
 To tackle the issue about simultaneity, lagged regressors are used instruments for 
forward-differenced indicators. In essence, to reduce the role of fixed effects (which can 
affect the assessed relationships), Helmet transformations are used for the regressors 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006). These transformations encompass forward 
mean-differencing of the indicators: instead of deducting the past observation from the 
present one, the average of all future observations is deducted from the variables. Such a 
transformation enables parallel or orthogonal conditions between forward-differenced 
indicators and lagged values. Regardless of the number of lags, data loss is minimised by 
computing the transformations for all observations, with the exception of the last for each 
cross-section.  “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as 
instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 104). 
 In the light of the above, the instruments or years that are considered as strictly 
exogenous affect institutional quality exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables. 
The statistical validity of this exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of the 
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test should be rejected for the instruments to explain institutional quality exclusively via the 
endogenous variable indicators. Whereas in an instrumental variable (IV) estimation process, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates 
that the instruments are invalid and hence do not explain the outcome variable exclusively via 
the investigated channels (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), within the 
framework of the GMM, the DHT is used to investigate whether years exhibit strict 
exogeneity. In the findings reported in the following section, the validity of the exclusion 
restriction is confirmed if the null hypotheses of DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) are 
not rejected.  
In accordance with mainstream literature on GMM application, four main information 
criteria are employed to assess estimated models (see Asongu & De Moor, 2016). First, the 
null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in 
difference which stands for the absence  of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be 
rejected.  Second, conversely, the alternative hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restrictions (OIR) tests should be rejected because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, the 
Hansen (Sargan) OIR test is robust (not robust) but weakened (not weakened) by instruments. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of   limiting instrument proliferation, we have ensured that the 
rule of thumb requirement for restricting over-identification is met, notably for each 
specification, the number of countries is higher than the number of instruments. Moreover, the 
validity of the Hansen OIR test is further assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
for exogeneity of instruments. Fourth, the Fisher test is also provided to examine to the joint 
validity of estimated coefficients.  
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4. Empirical results  
 Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 present findings related to linkages between ‘mobile phones, the 
diffusion of knowledge’ and respectively ‘political governance’, ‘economic governance’, 
‘institutional governance’ and ‘general governance’. Five key findings can be established 
from Table 2. First, with the exception of specifications pertaining to political governance, 
the unconditional effect of mobile phone is positive on political stability and ‘voice and 
accountability’. Second, interactions between mobile phones and (i) internet penetration have 
positive marginal effects on political stability and political governance and (ii) innovation 
have negative marginal effects on ‘voice and accountability’ and political governance. Third, 
with the exceptions of the interactions associated with internet and mobile phone penetrations 
which are negative, other corresponding net effects are positive2. Fourth, with the exception 
of the last specification pertaining to political governance, the governance dynamics are 
stationary and converging because the absolute values of corresponding lagged endogenous 
variables are between 0 and 13. The economic implication of convergence is that countries 
with lower levels of governance are catching-up with their counterparts with higher 
governance standards. Fifth, most of the significant control variables have expected signs.  On 
the unexpected negative sign from foreign direct investment, it is important to note that 
increased foreign investment can induce the elite in government to restrict voice and 
accountability in order to maintain a firm grip on rents accruing from underlying foreign 
investments. Moreover, the elite that are dependent on state resources and preferences to 
specific markets (that are substantially related to foreign investment), could take different 
positions in political circles that eventually lead to violence and political instability.  
 
                                                          
2 For example, the net effect from the interaction between mobile phones and innovation on ‘voice and 
accountability’ is 0.0009 ([-0.000001 × 91.231] + 0.001). Where 91.231 is the mean value of innovation (STJA).  
3 The interested reader can find more insights into the criterion for convergence and corresponding computation 
of the implied rate of convergence in Asongu (2014).  
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Table 2: The mobile phone, knowledge diffusion and political governance   
          
          
 Dependent variable: Political Governance 
          
 Political Stability  Voice & Accountability  Political Governance  
 Education  Innovation  Internet   Education  Innovation  Internet   Education  Innovation  Internet   
Constant  0.222*** -0.176* -0.075 -0.042 -0.184*** -0.148*** 0.116 -0.136* 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.056) (0.215) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182) (0.055) (0.930) 
Political Stability   (-1) 0.816*** 0.702*** 0.908*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Voice & Accountability (-1) --- --- --- 0.995*** 0.970*** 0.992*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Political Governance  (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.969*** 0.956*** 1.015*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.0002 0.004*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0006* 0.0006 0.001 -0.0005 
 (0.792) (0.000) (0.158) (0.003) (0.000) (0.080) (0.410) (0.100) (0.389) 
Education -0.006*** --- --- 0.0005 --- --- -0.002* --- --- 
 (0.000)   (0.459)   (0.090)   
Innovation (STJA) --- -0.00007** --- --- 0.00008*** --- --- 0.0001*** --- 
  (0.019)   (0.007)   (0.004)  
Internet  ---  -0.002 ---  -0.0005 ---  -0.001 
   (0.256)   (0.697)   (0.357) 
Education.Mob 0.00001  --- -0.00001  --- -0.00002  --- 
 (0.614)   (0.121)   (0.422)   
STJA.Mob --- -0.0000004 --- --- -0.000001 
*** 
--- --- -0.000001 
*** 
--- 
  (0.110)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Internet.Mob ---  0.00003* --- --- 0.00001 --- --- 0.00004*** 
   (0.061)   (0.386)   (0.004) 
GDP growth 0.006*** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003*** 0.001* 0.006** 0.003* 0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.120) (0.130) (0.255) (0.000) (0.055) (0.010) (0.055) (0.027) 
Population Growth  0.020 -0.055 -0.014 0.027** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.043** 0.023 0.030** 
 (0.384) (0.100) (0.447) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.264) (0.017) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.001* -0.000008 0.0002 -0.0008* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.064) (0.996) (0.647) (0.071) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.263) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.001 -0.001*** 0.0007* -0.0003 -0.0005** 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0009* 0.001*** 
 (0.103) (0.002) (0.095) (0.377) (0.017) (0.109) (0.716) (0.059) (0.000) 
          
Net Effects  na na 0.0011 na 0.0009 na na 0.0009 -0.0003 
          
AR(1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.468) (0.764) (0.860) (0.959) (0.670) (0.573) (0.405) (0.476) (0.473) 
Sargan OIR (0.911) (0.692) (0.314) (0.195) (0.027) (0.446) (0.911) (0.294) (0.292) 
Hansen OIR (0.399) (0.513) (0.325) (0.432) (0.230) (0.223) (0.640) (0.487) (0.407) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.483) (0.680) (0.860) (0.412) (0.563) (0.513) (0.948) (0.549) (0.801) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.347) (0.363) (0.131) (0.429) (0.146) (0.155) (0.325) (0.407) (0.210) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.574) (0.632) (0.198) (0.346) (0.126) (0.123) (0.683) (0.255) (0.566) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.223) (0.271) (0.621) (0.538) (0.680) (0.596) (0.429) (0.891) (0.238) 
          
Fisher  471.92*** 1305.08*** 2275.96*** 1798.51*** 5511.19*** 3257.26*** 1012.14*** 3845.09*** 9980.44*** 
Instruments  39 37 39 39 37 39 39 37 39 
Countries  46 47 47 46 47 47 46 47 47 
Observations  322 321 404 322 321 404 322 321 404 
          
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of marginal effects.  
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The following four major findings can be established from Table 3. First, the effect of 
mobile phones is consistently positive on economic governance and its constituents. Second, 
marginal effects corresponding to interactions with innovation are consistently negative while 
those corresponding to interactions with internet penetration are positive, with the exception 
of ‘regulation quality-oriented’ regressions. Accordingly, negative marginal effects imply 
decreasing returns to governance from mobile phones in the diffusion of knowledge whereas 
increasing marginal impacts mean increasing returns to governance from mobile phones in the 
diffusion of knowledge. Unfortunately, valid inferences cannot be established from the 
highlighted regressions pertaining to economic governance because of post-estimation 
presence of second-order autocorrelation in residuals. Third, net effects associated with the 
three remaining valid specifications related to ‘regulation quality’ and ‘government 
effectiveness’ are positive. Fourth, evidence of convergence is also consistently apparent. 
Fifth, most of the significant control variables display expected signs. We have already 
discussed why foreign direct investment could generate a negative sign above.  
 
Table 3: The mobile phone, knowledge diffusion and economic governance   
          
          
 Dependent variable: Economic Governance 
          
 Government Effectiveness   Regulation Quality   Economic Governance  
 Education  Innovation  Internet   Education  Innovation  Internet   Education  Innovation  Internet   
Constant  -0.090* -0.209*** -0.101*** -0.073** -0.402*** -0.202*** -0.033 -0.360*** -0.093** 
 (0.074) (0.000) (0.001) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.561) (0.000) (0.044) 
Government Effectiveness   (-1) 0.889*** 0.886*** 0.895*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Regulation Quality  (-1) --- --- --- 0.909*** 0.807*** 0.864*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Economic Governance  (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.928*** 0.866*** 0.929*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 0.0004 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
Education -0.0007 --- --- -0.0008 --- --- -0.001 --- --- 
 (0.244)   (0.160)   (0.333)   
Innovation (STJA) --- 0.0001*** --- --- 0.0002*** ---  0.0005*** --- 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Internet  --- --- -0.001 ---  0.002   -0.001 
   (0.234)   (0.180)   (0.644) 
Education.Mob -0.00001 --- --- 0.00001  --- -0.000008  --- 
 (0.258)   (0.283)   (0.611)   
STJA.Mob --- -0.000001 
*** 
--- --- -0.000002 
*** 
--- --- -0.000005 
*** 
--- 
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  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Internet.Mob --- --- 0.00002*** --- --- -0.00001 --- --- 0.00004** 
   (0.008)   (0.230)   (0.029) 
GDP growth 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.002 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.890) (0.789) (0.253) (0.258) (0.222) (0.013) 
Population Growth  0.025* 0.019 -0.010 0.016* 0.064*** 0.006 0.058** 0.108*** 0.009 
 (0.088) (0.129) (0.309) (0.080) (0.000) (0.238) (0.014) (0.000) (0.503) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.0006 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.001** 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.145) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.001 -0.0005* 0.0002 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0008***   -0.001* -0.0008 0.00003 
 (0.207) (0.068) (0.390) (0.004) (0.000) (0.007) (0.088) (0.174) (0.937) 
          
Net Effects  na 0.0009 0.0007 na 0.0028 na na 0.0035 0.0011 
          
AR(1) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.244) (0.298) (0.202) (0.094) (0.124) (0.149) (0.160) (0.082) (0.039) 
Sargan OIR (0.365) (0.703) (0.670) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.045) (0.386) (0.074) 
Hansen OIR (0.476) (0.463) (0.552) (0.290) (0.316) (0.346) (0.179) (0.679) (0.486) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.893) (0.418) (0.536) (0.364) (0.460) (0.728) (0.402) (0.977) (0.812) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.222) (0.463) (0.490) (0.290) (0.268) (0.189) (0.149) (0.331) (0.271) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.449) (0.421) (0.258) (0.240) (0.119) (0.164) (0.057) (0.597) (0.266) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.461) (0.485) (0.897) (0.449) (0.937) (0.757) (0.792) (0.618) (0.784) 
          
Fisher  1889.18*** 5159.88*** 3053.36*** 2995.56*** 15671.8*** 1192.88*** 5081.56*** 12695.4*** 6100.15*** 
Instruments  39 37 39 39 37 39 39 37 39 
Countries  46 47 47 46 47 47 46 47 47 
Observations  322 321 404 322 321 404 322 321 404 
          
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of marginal effects.  
 
 From Table 4 on the relationships between mobile phone penetration, knowledge 
diffusion and institutional governance: (i) the unconditional effect of mobile phone 
penetration is consistently positive on institutional governance and its constituents; (ii) 
conditional or marginal effects from interactions with innovation are consistently negative and 
that associated with education (internet penetration) in ‘the rule of law’ (corruption-control) 
regressions is also negative;  (iii) corresponding net effects are positive, with the highest 
magnitude in the innovation specification of ‘institutional governance’ regressions and (iv) 
most of the control variables are significant with expected signs. The unexpected sign of GDP 
growth may be traceable to the fact that economic prosperity may be associated with rent- 
seeking activities that decrease the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them.  
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 The findings from Table 5 pertaining to general governance are broadly consistent 
with those established in the preceding tables with corresponding marginal and net effects 
aligning with specifications on institutional governance in Table 2. With a weak exception 
from the last specification in Table 4, evidence of convergence is also consistently apparent in 
Tables 4-5. 
Table 4: The mobile phone, knowledge diffusion and institutional governance   
          
          
 Dependent variable: Institutional Governance 
          
 Rule of Law   Corruption Control    Institutional Governance  
 Education  Innovation  Internet   Education  Innovation  Internet   Education  Innovation  Internet   
Constant  -0.101** -0.216*** -0.106*** 0.044 -0.157*** -0.062 -0.089 -0.273*** -0.069 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.001) (0.352) (0.000) (0.161) (0.306) (0.001) (0.222) 
Rule of Law   (-1) 0.956*** 0.937*** 0.943*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Corruption Control  (-1) --- --- --- 0.826*** 0.841*** 0.894*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Institutional  Governance  (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.940*** 0.895*** 0.947*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.001** 0.0008* 0.0003 0.0005 0.001** 0.0009** 0.001** 0.002** 0.0007 
 (0.020) (0.080) (0.239) (0.232) (0.028) (0.047) (0.016) (0.019) (0.253) 
Education -0.001* --- --- -0.002*** --- --- -0.001 --- --- 
 (0.066)   (0.003)   (0.328)   
Innovation (STJA) --- 0.0001*** --- --- 0.0002*** ---  0.0004*** --- 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Internet  ---  0.002* ---  0.002**     0.003 
   (0.065)   (0.032)   (0.102) 
Education.Mob -0.00002**  --- 0.00001  --- -0.000002  --- 
 (0.029)   (0.354)   (0.894)   
STJA.Mob --- -0.000001 
*** 
--- --- -0.000002 
*** 
--- --- -0.000004 
*** 
--- 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Internet.Mob --- --- -0.000006 --- --- -
0.00002*** 
--- --- -0.00002 
   (0.400)   (0.002)   (0.157) 
GDP growth 0.002** -0.001** 0.0001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002* 
 (0.010) (0.038) (0.748) (0.003) (0.002) (0.061) (0.332) (0.002) (0.084) 
Population Growth  0.057*** 0.068*** 0.016** -0.018 0.001 -0.023** 0.043* 0.069*** 0.013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.354) (0.942) (0.013) (0.090) (0.003) (0.434) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.0006** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0009* 0.002 0.001*** 
 (0.025) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.144) (0.254) (0.056) (0.139) (0.007) 
Foreign Aid -0.0008** -0.001*** -0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 -0.00007 -0.0005 -0.000001 
 (0.040) (0.001) (0.105) (0.131) (0.658) (0.379) (0.899) (0.320) (0.997) 
          
Net Effects  0.0001 0.0007 na na 0.0008 0.0008 na 0.1635 na 
          
AR(1) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.212) (0.745) (0.343) (0.394) (0.410) (0.350) (0.188) (0.205) (0.179) 
Sargan OIR (0.585) (0.330) (0.785) (0.434) (0.798) (0.971) (0.540) (0.567) (0.959) 
Hansen OIR (0.334) (0.156) (0.159) (0.154) (0.106) (0.675) (0.529) (0.369) (0.807) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.367) (0.112) (0.316) (0.742) (0.531) (0.667) (0.525) (0.357) (0.604) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.342) (0.322) (0.160) (0.059) (0.058) (0.558) (0.470) (0.391) (0.772) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
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H excluding group (0.510) (0.497) (0.078) (0.309) (0.245) (0.614) (0.523) (0.816) (0.611) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.199) (0.040) (0.592) (0.126) (0.086) (0.579) (0.451) (0.048) (0.835) 
          
Fisher  922.40*** 3746.83*** 1354.52*** 713.21*** 3499.96*** 2619.29*** 958.63*** 6621.88*** 759.23*** 
Instruments  39 37 39 39 37 39 39 37 39 
Countries  46 47 47 46 47 47 46 47 47 
Observations  322 321 404 322 321 404 322 321 404 
          
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles.  DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of marginal effects.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: The mobile phone, knowledge diffusion and general  governance   
    
 Dependent variable: General Governance    
 Education  Innovation  Internet   
Constant  -0.119 -0.346*** -0.072 
 (0.217) (0.000) (0.306) 
General Governance    (-1) 0.968*** 0.961*** 1.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.003*** 0.002** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.201) 
Education 0.0001 --- --- 
 (0.910)   
Innovation (STJA) --- 0.0005*** --- 
  (0.000)  
Internet  --- --- -0.009*** 
   (0.001) 
Education.Mob -0.00003 --- --- 
 (0.125)   
STJA.Mob --- -0.000006*** --- 
  (0.000)  
Internet.Mob --- --- 0.0001*** 
   (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.003* 0.002 -0.0008 
 (0.078) (0.319) (0.615) 
Population Growth  0.080*** 0.101*** 0.065*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.002** 0.002 0.0003 
 (0.015) (0.105) (0.542) 
Foreign Aid -0.0006 -0.0008 0.001 
 (0.697) (0.231) (0.008) 
    
Net Effects  na 0.1452 -0.0005 
    
AR(1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.290) (0.205) (0.181) 
Sargan OIR (0.607) (0.764) (0.989) 
Hansen OIR (0.426) (0.379) (0.495) 
    
DHT for instruments    
(a)Instruments in levels    
H excluding group (0.432) (0.322) (0.587) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.408) (0.431) (0.394) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff)) (0.290) (0.534) (0.246) 
H excluding group (0.626) (0.201) (0.837) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous)    
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Fisher  2261.22*** 7270.26*** 31108.08*** 
Instruments  39 37 39 
Countries  46 47 47 
Observations  322 321 404 
    
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles.   
DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying  
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and  
the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) 
 tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance  
of marginal effects.  
 
 
5 Discussions, concluding implications and further research direction 
 We set-out to assess the mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge for better 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. For this purpose, we have 
employed a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations. 
The empirical evidence is based on three complementary knowledge diffusion variables 
(innovation, internet penetration and educational quality) and ten governance indicators that 
are bundled and unbundled. The following are some of the main findings. First, there is an 
unconditional positive effect of mobile phone penetration on good governance. Second, the 
net effects on political, economic and institutional governances, associated with the 
interaction of the mobile phone with knowledge diffusion variables are positive for the most 
part. Third countries with low levels of governance are catching-up their counterparts with 
higher levels of governance.  
 The above findings are broadly consistent with Snow (2009) who has assessed the 
relevance on mobile phones in mitigating corruption in Africa. The evidence of some 
insignificant net effects and decreasing marginal impacts may be an indication that the mobile 
phone could also be employed to decrease government quality. While this position is also 
maintained by Snow (2009), the author concludes that the negative effects are very likely to 
outweigh associated positive net effects on corruption. Overall, this study has established net 
positive effects for the most part.  Five rationales could elicit the positive net effects on good 
governance from the interaction between mobile phones and knowledge diffusion, among 
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others, the knowledge variables enhance: reach, access, adoption, cost-effectiveness and 
interaction. In a nut shell, the positive net effects are apparent because the knowledge 
diffusion variables complement mobile phones in reducing information asymmetry and 
monopoly that create conducive conditions for bad governance. This is consistent with 
Hosman and Fife (2012) in the perspective that the mobile telephony consolidates the 
phenomenon of top-down-meeting-bottom-up partnerships which are rising across Africa and 
offering avenues for building the necessary feedback gaps between development actors in 
order to create relevant applications that address the genuine needs of the population.  
 Whereas the established findings are consistent with the theoretical underpinnings 
discussed in Section 2, they also have other relevant theoretical contributions, notably on 
information asymmetry and convergence.  
First, with regard to information asymmetry, mobile telephony reduces information 
asymmetry through enhanced oversight by civil society, public officials and households. In 
essence, the evidence that mobile phones are positively (negatively) correlated with the 
informal (formal) economic sector (Asongu, 2013) is an indication that a great chunk of civil 
society that operates within informal politico-economic and social sectors can contribute 
towards improving government quality through the mobile phone. In essence, mobile 
telephony enables the sharing of information that ultimately reduces information asymmetry 
by allocating resources more efficiently and minimising ‘government cost’. The narrative is 
broadly in accordance with the paradigm of information sharing for reducing information 
asymmetry in financial institutions (see Claus & Grimes, 2003). Hence, based on our findings 
the theoretical underpinnings of information asymmetry in financial institutions can be 
extended to government institutions.  
 Second, the findings have shown that past differences in government quality have a 
less proportionate impact on future differences in government quality. The corresponding 
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economic interpretation is that countries with lower levels of governance are catching-up their 
counterparts with higher governance levels. This finding contributes to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the catch-up literature in the perspective that catch-up is beyond income-
convergence (see Asongu, 2014) and can be extended from GDP per capita to other 
development outcomes. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) recently used catch-up in negative 
government signals to predict the 2011 Arab Spring.  
Overall, the findings established by this study are in accordance with the theoretical 
underpinnings of cross-country income convergence that have been substantially documented 
within the frameworks of neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 
1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Fung, 2009) and 
which currently being extended to other fields of economics and finance, inter alia: inclusive 
human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010); knowledge economy (Asongu, 2015b) and 
financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012). Given the limited applicability of 
beta convergence techniques within country-specific settings, the findings leave room for 
extension with the sigma convergence approach for country-specific trends on government 
quality catch-up.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Educational 
Quality 
Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Innovation  STJA  Scientific and Technical Journal Articles  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet  Internet  Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Political Governance  0.000 1.292 -3.440 2.583 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality  -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Economic Governance  0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Rule of Law 0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Control of Corruption  -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Institutional Governance 0.0002 1.364 -3.588 3.766 578 
General Governance 0.004 2.210 -6.308 5.561 577 
Mobile phone penetration  23.379 28.004    0.000 147.202 572 
Educational Quality  43.601 14.529 12.466 100.236 444 
Innovation (STJA) 91.231 360.522 0.000 2915.5 480 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.605 566 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 608 
Population growth  2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 588 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
Foreign aid   11.687 14.193 -0.253 181.187 606 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis (uniform sample size: 319) 
                   
Governance variables Knowledge Diffusion variables  Control variables Mobile   
Political governance  Economic governance  Institutional governance          Phone  
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov Edu STJA Internet GDPg Popg FDI Aid   
1.000 0.678 0.909 0.649 0.574 0.634 0.661 0.802 0.765 0.811 -0.366 0.014 0.377 -0.070 -0.314 0.009 -0.114 0.338 PS 
 1.000 0.922 0.793 0.758 0.803 0.655 0.822 0.771 0.882 -0.350 0.266 0.417 0.056 -0.314 -0.046 -0.078 0.366 VA 
  1.000 0.790 0.731 0.788 0.718 0.887 0.838 0.925 -0.390 0.158 0.434 -0.004 -0.342 -0.021 -0.104 0.385 Polgov 
   1.000 0.868 0.969 0.808 0.888 0.887 0.940 -0.292 0.351 0.449 0.025 -0.410 -0.054 -0.205 0.441 GE 
    1.000 0.963 0.682 0.790 0.770 0.874 -0.294 0.353 0.288 -0.007 -0.349 -0.078 -0.235 0.394 RQ 
     1.000 0.774 0.870 0.860 0.940 -0.357 0.364 0.384 0.010 -0.394 -0.068 -0.227 0.433 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.825 0.956 0.869 -0.421 0.224 0.421 -0.082 -0.359 -0.062 -0.118 0.399 CC 
       1.000 0.954 0.961 -0.406 0.163 0.462 -0.030 -0.371 -0.039 -0.145 0.403 RL 
        1.000 0.957 -0.433 0.203 0.462 -0.059 -0.381 -0.053 -0.138 0.420 Instgov 
         1.000 -0.418 0.259 0.454 -0.018 -0.398 -0.051 -0.167 0.439 G.gov 
          1.000 -0.137 -0.497 0.139 0.403 -0.049 0.196 -0.449 Edu 
           1.000 0.137 -0.011 -0.186 -0.102 -0.166 0.346 STJA 
            1.000 -0.042 -0.455 0.060 -0.183 0.697 Internet 
             1.000 0.181 0.197 0.124 -0.099 GDPg 
              1.000 0.065 0.419 -0.404 Popg 
               1.000 0.209 0.099 FDI 
                1.000 -0.248 Aid 
                 1.000 Mobile 
                   
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. 
 CC: Corruption-Control.RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance. Edu : Educational quality. STJA: Scientific & Technical Journal Articles.  
Internet: Internet Penetration.  GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Aid: Foreign aid. Mobile: Mobile Phone penetration.  
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Appendix 4: Persistence of dependent variables  
           
 Political Governance  Economic Governance  Institutional Governance   
 PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov 
           
PS(-1) 0.965          
VA(-1)  0.982         
Polgov(-1)   0.981        
GE(-1)    0.979       
RQ(-1)     0.981      
Ecogov(-1)      0.986     
CC(-1)       0.967    
RL(-1)        0.985   
Instgov(-1)         0.984  
G.gov(-1)          0.990 
           
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: 
General Governance.  
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